A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.
Introduction
A wide literature on voting theory is concerned with the theoretical debate between Condorcet social choice methods on one hand, and positional (or scoring) systems -voting à la Borda -on the other hand. The first ones consider, following Condorcet (1785) , that the collective choice has to be based on majority duals between alternatives; while the second ones introduced by Borda (1781), suggest to deduce the collective preference from a numerical evaluation taking into account the positions of the alternatives in the orders of individual preferences.
There are several arguments in favor of either type of procedures, discussed in an abundant literature (see Nurmi 1987 and 1999 , and Saari 2006 among others). The most significant contributions concerning positional rules are due to Smith (1973) , Young (1974 Young ( , 1975 and Saari (1994) . The results presented by these three authors reveal some very natural properties that are satisfied only by positional mechanisms. They are certainlty powerful arguments for adopting a positional approach. Unfortunately we know from Condorcet (1785) that the Borda rule and more generally the positional rules do not necessarily choose the Condorcet winner when it exists which is not the case of Condorcet consistent rule. A Condorcet winner is an alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals: such an alternative would beat every other in majority comparisons. A Condorcet consistent rule selects the Condorcet winner when it exists. Similarly, it is well known that positional rules fail also to satisfy some weaker version of this property.
There is no doubt about the importance of these results, since it provides a clear axiomatic boundary between Borda's and Condorcet's approaches of social choice mechanisms. It is worth noting, however, that the above-mentioned negative results have been obtained by assuming that the simple majority is used. An alternative is majority preferred to an other alternative if at least more than one half of the individuals prefer this alternative to the other one 1 . The question we propose to tackle in this paper is then the following: to what extent does a larger majority (supra-majority) modify these negative results? To assume a larger majority is not so common in social choice theory. An important result concerning a supra-majority have been established by Ferejohn and Grether (1974) . According to a given supra-majority m, an alternative is socially preferred to an other alternative if at least m individuals prefer this alternative to the other one. They give a necessary and sufficient condition on the majority needed in order to ensure that the rule associated with that majority always selects an alternative 2 . In a voting game context, they give simple and elegant condition for which the Core is non empty 3 . The purpose of this paper is then to give conditions such that the alternatives chosen by a rule belongs to the Core. For that, we follow Baharad and Nitzan (2003) who study the relationship between the positional rule and what they call the "q Condorcet consistency" principle. Given a supra-majority q, a rule satisfies this principle if the winner of this rule is not preferred by any other alternative by a q majority of individuals. Unfortunately, they have results for only one special positional rule, the Borda rule. We want to extent these results by investigating more positional rules.
Note that the well known positional approach takes place in a single stage process, where the winner(s) is (are) the alternative(s) with the highest score. But it can also be used in a multi-stage process of sequential eliminations, in each stage of which the alternative(s) with the least votes is (are) eliminated. We will then focus also on this kind of rules in this paper.
Our main objective is then to study the conditions on the majority that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy the q Condorcet consistency principle.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 is a presentation of the general framework with notations and definitions. Section 3 provides a characterization of the most famous simple positional rules vis-à-vis the q Condorcet Consitency principle. Then, Section 4 provides results for sequential positional rules. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Notations and definitions
Consider a finite set N of n individuals or voters. For any subset S of N , S c denotes the complementary of S, that is N \ S. Consider a finite set A = {a 1 , ..., a k } of k distinct alternatives (or candidates), k 3. Let 2 A be the set of nonempty subsets of A. Individual preference relations are defined over A and are assumed to be strict (indifference is not allowed). Assume that the preference relation R i of individual i, i 2 N , is a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation (or simply a linear order) on A and let L be the set of all linear orders on A. A profile is an n-tuple R = (R i ) i2N of individual preference relations, one for each individual. The set of all profiles on N will be denoted by L N .
A social choice correspondence (SCC ) is a mapping F from L N to the set of nonempty subsets of A. This rule specifies the collective choice for any preference profile, F : L N ! 2 A . For all profile R, F (R) is the set of winners according to R.
Note that we do not introduce in this paper a mechanism in order to break ties among alternatives. That is why we focus on social choice correspondences and not on social choice functions which assign a single alternative to each profile. It should however be emphasized that the results presented here remain valid when we take into account a mechanism in order to break ties. Now, we need additional notations to present the simple positional rules (PR) and the sequential positional rules (SPR) under focus in the present paper.
Given B 2 2 A such that |B| 2 (|B| is the cardinality of the set B) and a h 2 B, let r (B, a h , R i ) be the rank, according to R i , of a h among alternatives in B. A scoring vector is a |B|-tuple ↵ = ↵ 1 , ..., ↵ r , ..., ↵ |B| of real numbers such that for all r = 1, ..., |B| 1, ↵ r ↵ r+1 , and
) is the number of points given to the alternative a h 2 B by the individual i.
h 2 B and a scoring vector ↵ 2 R |B| , the score of a
. In social choice processes using PR, the winning alternatives are those with the highest score, as stated in the following definition. 
. From the definitions of PR, it appears that given some issue B, a PR is defined by a vector ↵ 2 R |B| . We can then express the three usual procedures: plurality rule denoted F ↵ 0 where ↵ = (1, 0, ..., 0); negative plurality rule denoted F ↵ 1 with ↵ = (1, ..., 1, 0) and Borda rule denoted
We now introduce sequential positional rules (SPR). Let ↵ A = ↵ k , ..., ↵ |B| , ..., ↵ 2 a collection of scoring vectors, each vector ↵ |B| being associated with each possible cardinality |B| of the subset B ✓ A, |B| 2. At the first step of the sequential process, scores are computed using the vector ↵ k and the losing alternatives defined below are eliminated. In the next step, the corresponding vector is used to compute the scores and again the losing alternatives are eliminated. The sequential process is repeated until a set of winners (possibly one) is obtained (see Lepelley 1996) .
More formally,
Note that when there is only one element in B, L (B, R, ↵ 1 ) = ;. Then we have the following definition for the SPR.
Definition 4. A sequential positional rule (SPR) associated with a collection of vectors ↵
with A p sequentially defined in the following way:
. In order to illustrate this definition, let us consider the three-alternative case, that is A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. We then have
where 1, and 0 are the scores of the alternatives ranked first, second and third respectively, in individual preference relations in the first step, and ↵ 2 = (1, 0). More generally, given a profile of individual preferences, the total score of an alternative is the sum of individual scores, over the whole set of individuals. A PR selects the set of alternatives with the highest score. As a difference, an SPR first eliminates the alternatives with the smallest score at the first step, and then selects the alternatives with the highest score at the last step.
Note that with this formulation of sequential positional rules, there is no fixed relation between two scoring vectors of different steps: for example, we may use plurality at step 1 and negative plurality at step 2, etc. However, the most well known sequential positional rules are the iterative positional rules, where at each step the scoring vector changes only with respect to the number of alternatives. More formally, if at each step, ↵ |B| is the |B|-tuple (1, 0, ..., 0) then it is Hare's Procedure denoted F
, ...,
, respectively. It should be also noted that alternatives are not removed one after the other if several of them have the worst score. They should be removed all together. Furthermore, if all alternatives have the same score at a given step, then there is no elimination: all the alternatives are selected.
We can now define the q Condorcet consistency principle.
Definition 5. Given a profile R, a rational number q, an alternative a h 2 A is q-majority preferred to an alternative a j 2 A iff |{i 2 N : a h R i a j }| q.n, with q 2
. a j is said to be q-majority beaten by a h . In this paper we assume that n is large enough such that for all rational number k, k.n is an integer.
4
Let C q (R) , the q Condorcet majority set, defined as the set of alternatives in A which are not q majority beaten by any other alternative in A.
It is well known from Ferejohn and Grether (1974) that a necessary and sufficient condition under which C q (R) 6 = ; for all R is that q > k 1 k .
Definition 6. Given a rational number q 2
for any profile R. Our main objective is then to determine conditions on q that ensure that usual PR and SPR satisfy q CC.
Simple Positional rules

Usual procedures
We will first present results for the three usual simple positional rules, i.e. plurality, negative plurality and Borda.
The following result completely solves the plurality case.
Proof. 1) We know by Ferejohn and Grether (1974) 
. In order to show that F ↵ 0 satisfies q-CC, it is enough to show that if R is a profile for which a 1 is q-majority beaten by (say) a 2 then a 1 / 2 F ↵ 0 (R). Since a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 , we have |S| qn where S = {i 2 N : a 2 R i a 1 }. Since the scoring vector is ↵ = (1, 0, ..., 0) : |S| qn implies Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵)  n qn = (1 q)n.
Let a max be a candidate such that Sc(A, a max , R, ↵) = max 2jk Sc(A, a j , R, ↵). Since
This ends the proof. The answer of our main question is given below for the negative plurality rule.
does not satisfies q-CC.
Proof. Let q 2
To prove that F ↵ 1 does not satisfies q-CC, we shall determine a profile R for which a winner, according to F ↵ 1 is q-majority beaten. For that, consider the profile R in which each individual i has the preference R i defined as follows :
The candidate a 1 is q-majority beaten (everybody prefers a 2 to a 1 ) meanwhile a 1 2 F ↵ 1 (R). As Baharad and Nitzan (2003), we now solve the Borda case (with a slightly different proof).
. In order to show that F ↵ 2 satisfies q-CC, it is enough to show that if R is a profile for which a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 then a 1 / 2 F ↵ 2 (R). Since a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 , we have |S| qn where S = {i 2 N : a 2 R i a 1 }.
This ends the proof.
General Case
The aim of this section is to identify the conditions on the quota q under which a given PR satisfies q CC.
A sufficient condition.
We will first introduce the following proposition giving a sufficient condition under which winners for a given simple positional rule are never q-majority beaten. For any scoring vector ↵ = (↵ 1 , ↵ 2 , ..., ↵ k ), we let ↵ = min{↵ r ↵ r+1 ; r = 1, 2, ..., k 1}. 
. In order to prove that F ↵ satisfies q-CC it is enough to show that for any profile R for which a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 , a 1 / 2 F ↵ (R). Let R be such a profile : then |S| qn where S = {i 2 N :
Since Sc(A, a 2 , R, ↵) Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) > 0, it follows that a 1 / 2 F ↵ (R) and this ends the proof. , then F ↵ satisfies q-CC.
Conversely, assume that q  . To show that F ↵ does not satisfies q-CC, consider the following profile R in which: ⇢ qn individuals have preference a 2 R i a 1 R i a 3
(1 q)n have preference a 1 R i a 3 R i a 2 For the profile R so defined, a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 . However let us compute the scores:
we have :
Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) = qn + (1 q)n Sc(A, a 2 , R, ↵) = qn and Sc(A, a 3 , R, ↵) = (1 q)n Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) Sc(A, a 2 , R, ↵) = qn + (1 q)n qn
Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) Sc(A, a 3 , R, ↵) = qn + (1 q)n (1 q)n = n( q + 1 q + q) = n((2 1)q + 1 ) > 0 because 2 1 > 0 and 1 > 0 It then follows that a 1 2 F ↵ (R) and hence, F ↵ does not satisfy q-CC. The following result deals with the case < .
Proof. 1) By Ferejohn and Grether (1974), it is obvious that if q  2 3
then F ↵ does not satisfies q-CC.
2) Conversely, let q > . In order to prove that F ↵ satisfies q-CC, we will show that for any profile R for which a 1 is q majority beaten by a 2 , a 1 / 2 F ↵ (R). Let R be such a profile. Assume on the contrary that a 1 2 F ↵ (R). There exists a subset S such that |S| = qn and a 2 R i a 1 for all i 2 S. Let ✓ be the proportion of individuals in S holding preference a 2 R i a 1 R i a 3 . With no loss of generality, we can then assume that in S: ⇢ ✓n individuals have preference a 2 R i a 1 R i a 3 and
The score of a 1 is bounded above by ✓n + (1 q)n and furthermore, the value ✓n + (1 q)n is obtained if and only if every individual in S c ranks a 1 at the first position. Now let be the proportion of individuals in S c with preference a 1 R i a 3 R i a 2 . With no loss of generality, we can then assume that in S c : ⇢ n individuals have preference a 1 R i a 3 R i a 2 and
At this level we will distinguish two cases : = 1 q and < 1 q :
In this case,
and
As Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) Sc(A, a 2 , R, ↵) 0 and Sc(A, a 1 , R, ↵) Sc(A, a 3 , R, ↵) 0, we have:
On the other hand we have 0  < 1 q which implies q > (1 2 )✓ + q + 1 (thanks to (⇤)).
Thanks to propositions 2 and 3 above, we can state the following result. , and when = 1, q ↵ = 1.
Sequential Positional Rules
We will present results in this section for the three usual SPR, i.e. Hare's Procedure (F
). Before presenting the results of this section, we recall that we assumed that n, the number of voters is large enough so that kn is an integer whenever k is a rational number.
The following result completely solves Hare's case.
Theorem 5. Let A = {a 1 , ..., a k }, and let ↵ = (1, 0, ..., 0) the scoring vector at each step. Let
Proof. First we will show that if q  (1
does not satisfy q-CC. We then need to construct a profile R such that (say) a 1 2 F ↵ A 0 (R) meanwhile a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 . Let ✓ = n 2 k 1 and consider the following profile :
:
With respect to R a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 . Indeed, the number of voters who prefer a 2 to a 1 is
Then a 1 is q majority beaten by a 2 . Now let us show that a 1 2 F
) be the set of losing candidates at step t, we have F
where p is the number of steps. The scoring vector at any step t is the |A t |-tuple (1, 0, 0, ..., 0). From the definition of R it is obvious that Sc(A 1 , a 2 , R, ↵
It can be easily seen that : 
Conversely, assume that q > 1
Let us show that F ↵ A 0 (R) satisfies q-CC. For that, let R be a profile for which a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 and a 1 2 F
Assume that for the profile R, there are p steps and that the set of losing candidates are respectively L(A 1 , R, ↵
) and the set of winners is F Since a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 , Sc(A 1 , a 1 , R, ↵
)  (1 q)n. As n 1 candidates are eliminated at the first step, we have Sc (A 1 , a h , R, ↵
) < n 1 (1 q)n, therefore at the second step,
) are eliminated at step 2, we have Sc(A 2 , a r , R, ↵
This is a contradiction. Conclusion : we cannot have a 1 q majority beaten and a 1 2 F
The following result deals with Coombs' procedure. 
Proof. 1) By Ferejohn and Grether (1974) it is obvious that if
2) It then suffices to prove that if q > k 1 k then for any R for which a 1 is q-majority beaten by
Let R be such a profile. Assume the contrary :
Since a 1 is q-majority beaten by a 2 , we have |S| qn where S = {i 2 N : a 2 R i a 1 }. Recall that at any step t in which the set of alternatives is A t , the scoring vector is the |A t |-tuple (1, 1, ...1, 0). Assuming that there are p steps and that L(A t , R, ↵ |At| ) is the set of eliminated candidates at step t, we have F
) . We will prove that if a 1 2 F
We will then show that at any step
. Consider a step t and assume, with no loss of generality that v (v > 0) candidates have so far
) Let a 0 be a candidate such that : Therefore, (k µ)s
which is a contradiction. We conclude that a 1 / 2 F ↵ A 1 (R). The last result solves Nanson's rule. , 0) the scoring vector at each step t where the set of alternatives is A t . Let q 2] (1974). Regarding Hare, the quota of (1
is greater than the previous one, which suppose that this is more difficult with Hare to respect q Condorcet Consistency.
We also consider the case of all simple positional rules. However our study is limited to the three alternative case. It appears indeed that the issue of characterizing quota under which a given rule satisfies our consistency property is a difficult task. We do not try to solve the problem for general sequential positional rules since it would require to define what is the scoring vectors at each step of the process.
Finally, it is worth noting that it may seems appropriate to extend our results by evaluating the propensitivity of positional rules to violate this majority condition when the quota is not achieved. This is a very common approach in the context of simple majority. That is why it can be interesting to apply it in the context of supra-majority.
